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On Thu, 27 Aug 1998 HARTMANN@PA.MSU.EDU wrote:
> The discussion to date has not distinguished between prothetic and
> metathetic quantities. Prothetic is associated with amount; metathetic
> is a point on a scale. Loudness is prothetic, we say, "More loudness."
> Pitch is metathetic, we say, "Higher pitch." We don't say, "More pitch."
> Therefore, it is not appropriate to compare pitch (metathetic) with the
> mass of animals (prothetic).
Dear Bill (and list),
Your provocative statement got me to dig out my old philosopher's cap from
University of Toronto days, shake off the dust, and put it on.
My understanding is that "prothetic" and "nomothetic" refer to dimensions
of experience, not to dimensions of the physical world. A dimension of
experience, such as pitch, can be either prothetic or metathetic
(metathetic, in the case of pitch). The mass of an animal is physical, so
it can't be either prothetic or metathetic.
It occurred to me that if we're not allowed to link quantitative physical
variables such as wavelength or repetition rate with metathetic variables
of experience, such as color or pitch, psychophysics (i.e., Psycho <--
physics) becomes impossible.
The argument about the big animal/low sound consists actually of two
statements, one physical and one psychophysical, neither of which link a
metathetic to a prothetic assertion.
1. Physical: The size of an animal is correlated with the frequencies it
produces. (maps physical to physical)
2. Psychophysical: Frequencies that are "low" (LOW1) in a physical sense
give rise to pitch that is "low" (LOW2) in an experiential
sense. (maps psychological to physical)
We use the same English word "low" for LOW1 and LOW2. This leads to some
confusion. "LOW2 varies with LOW1" is an empirically determined,
Sorry to be so pedantic but it's your fault, Bill, for switching me into
Whenever I wear my philosopher's cap, I develop a compulsion to try to get
folks to distinguish between physical and psychological terms, so that
clear psycho-physical statements can be made.
This issue also comes up in talking about timbre. The waveform generated
by an instrument has no timbre (if one reserves the word "timbre" for
describing experience) but can be described by a number of physical
variables. I think of timbre as a dimension of the experience of "sound"
(SOUND2) that results from the physical "sound" (SOUND1). It would be
helpful if we had a different word for SOUND1 and SOUND2, but we don't. If
we did, the old philosophical question, "Does a tree falling in the woods
make a sound if there is no one to hear it?", would never have been
thought to be a puzzle.
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